SDN | Published 2018 | Data collected 2012/13 and 2016/17 in Bayelsa and Rivers States
For decades, artisanal oil refining in the Niger Delta has been treated as a crime to be crushed. This report asks a different question: why does it keep growing? Drawing on primary data from more than one hundred refineries visited across Bayelsa and Rivers States, collected in 2012–13 and again in 2016–17, together with interviews, focus groups and workshops with people working across the industry, SDN built an economic model of the whole value chain, from pipeline tapping to refining to the filling station, and tracked how it changed over five years.
A bigger, better-organised and far more profitable industry
- Camps multiplied: the report estimates five times as many camps, and six times as many refineries, as five years earlier, with camps able to absorb far more crude oil.
- Earnings exploded: total earnings across the supply chain rose twenty-four-fold, from an estimated £24 million in 2012 to £578 million in 2016/17.
- Refineries got more efficient: production efficiency rose from 45% to 88%, and camp profit margins from 17% to around 60%. Investors can now recover their set-up costs in nine to eighteen days.
- The market shifted home: the share of stolen crude sold domestically rose from an estimated 25% to 75%, driven by national fuel scarcity, subsidy changes and piracy and security risks on export routes. Diesel and kerosene, the simplest products to make, are in greatest demand, lowering the barrier for new entrants.
Who gains, and who pays
The gains went to owners, investors and distributors, not to workers. The average number of workers per camp fell by about 40% as owners cut labour costs. In Rivers State, worker salaries stagnated at around £6,000 a year, while camp owners captured the extra earnings. Camp workers often work barefoot, without protective equipment, handling fuel the report warns may contain carcinogens such as benzene. Security agencies profit too: the report estimates payments to them grew twenty-fold, from £1.5 million in 2012 to more than £30 million, and warns the true figure is likely far higher.
The people in the industry are not who the public imagines. As one senior figure in the industry, who holds a degree in petroleum engineering, put it, “Lack of meaningful employment and monetary needs prompted my indulgence.” A camp owner summed up the cycle in the phrase that gives the report its title: “More money, more problems.”
Why the current response is not working
The report finds that militarised responses are failing and may be making things worse. Camps are built faster than they can be destroyed, destruction burns crude and refined products on site, adding to the pollution, and respondents describe security agencies taking regular payments from the industry, and some investing directly in camps. The alternatives on the table fare little better. Modular refineries would require around £133 million of investment for a typical 30,000-barrel plant, far beyond local actors, and would favour oil companies and large investors. Community pipeline surveillance schemes risk repeating the dependency problems of the Presidential Amnesty Programme.
There is a more hopeful finding. A community-led dialogue process convened by SDN contributed to mass voluntary desistance across neighbouring local government areas in one of the research states, progress the report describes as real but fragile, and evidence that people inside the industry will leave it if offered credible alternatives.
What the report recommends:
- Develop alternative livelihoods for people working in artisanal refining, designed through community-led dialogue so they build on skills people already have.
- Pilot and document these approaches, with a view to scaling them to other locations.
- Target investment where it would do most to reverse the industry’s growth, coordinated across NGOs and aligned with government plans for the region.
- Support the responsible dismantling of camps and safe disposal of crude and products, with responsibility moved to an agency mandated to protect the environment, and progress properly documented.
- Tackle demand for black-market fuel by expanding access to legitimate, affordable energy, including off-grid gas-to-power and renewables for riverine communities.
- Investigate the impact of this fuel on air quality, including the soot that has affected Port Harcourt.
Why This Matters Today
The report’s central insight, that enforcement alone feeds the industry it is meant to end, is still the heart of the debate. It also connects to the rest of SDN’s evidence base. Dirty Fuel found that shortages and poor quality in the official fuel supply sustain demand for informal alternatives. The Presidential Amnesty Programme report shows how temporary schemes harden into long-term dependencies. And as the Divestment report notes, as international companies hand over onshore assets, responsibility for protecting pipelines and managing theft passes to operators with fewer resources. Whatever replaces militarised crackdowns will need the same ingredients this report called for: credible livelihoods, energy access and the participation of the people involved.
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